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  Abstract 
In the post–World War II period, the police department emerged as one of the most 
problematic municipal agencies in New York City. Patrolmen and their superiors did not pay 
much attention to crime; instead they looked the other way, received payoffs from organized 
crime, performed haphazardly, and tolerated conditions that were unacceptable in a modern 
city with global ambitions. At the same time, patrolmen demanded deference and respect from 
African American civilians and routinely demeaned and brutalized individuals who appeared to 
be challenging their authority. The antagonism between African Americans and the New York 
Police Department (NYPD) intensified as local and national black freedom organizations paid 
more attention to police behavior and made police reform one of their main goals. 
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  Article 
In July of 1964, the first major uprising of the 1960s occurred in the African American neighbor- 
hoods of Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant in New York City. It grew out of a rally organized by 
the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) in Harlem after a black junior high school student was 
shot and killed by a white police lieutenant in the Upper East Side. Protesters from the rally 
marched to the 28th precinct on West 123rd Street (Figure 1) and after police tried to push them 
to the sidewalk across the street they started chanting “Murder, murder, murder” and singing “We 
Shall Not Be Moved, Murphy [the police commissioner] is a bastard, he must be removed.”1 
After arrests, scuffles, and a counteroffensive, the police managed to clear the street. However, 
the crowd grew to more than a thousand on Seventh Avenue and West 123rd Street. With rein- 
forcements, the police began to charge through the crowd, but many of the people who dispersed 
were joined by others who activated fire alarms, set small fires, destroyed stores, and threw 
objects from rooftops at the police. The insurrection lasted for about a week and spread to 
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Figure 1. The central business district of Central Harlem. This is where most political gatherings and 
rallies occurred. The corners of West 125th Street and Seventh Avenue were the most popular 
locations. However, as these corners filled, various groups and speakers moved north or south on 
Seventh Avenue or east and west on West 125th Street. Nevertheless, West 125th Street in its entirety 
was extremely popular with activists setting tables or roaming the sidewalks asking pedestrians to sign 
petitions, join their organizations, register to vote, take newsletters, or buy newspapers. This is the area 
where the Harlem Riot of 1964 also began. 
 
 
Bedford-Stuyvesant in Brooklyn where a peaceful demonstration also escalated into a violent 
confrontation with the police.2 
While it is difficult to determine the exact causes of this or any other major uprising of the 
1960s, the acrimonious relationship between the police and the community contributed far more 
than just the spark. In his study of the northern civil rights movement, Thomas J. Sugrue contends 
that of “all the underlying causes of rioting, nothing mattered more than police-community 
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conflict.”3 Robert M. Fogelson argues that “it is impossible to conceive of the riots erupting with 
the same frequency or assuming the same form were it not for the ghetto’s intense resentment of 
the police.”4 Harlan Hahn and Joe R. Feagin claim that “not only were policemen and black 
ghetto residents principal antagonists in civil disorders, but the animosities between them also 
were a significant impetus for violence.”5 James W. Button states that “the most frequently cited 
grievance of blacks in riot cities was ‘police practices’ vis-à-vis Negroes, and no other single 
factor precipitated so much violence so often as did some form of incident involving blacks and 
the police.”6 Survey after survey during the period revealed that one of the overriding concerns 
of urban blacks was police misconduct and that this issue functioned as one of the primary causes 
of riots.7 Despite these assessments, many historians of the black freedom movement have taken 
the antagonistic police–community relationship for granted and focused on other issues. This is 
partly because the repressive behavior of the police is seen as a reflection of the larger power 
structure and partly because civil rights–influenced legislation focused on schools, housing, pub- 
lic accommodations, voting rights, and employment. 
In recent years, there has been a reexamination of the black freedom movement, and this 
includes growing attention paid to the criminal justice system in general and the police in 
particular.8 When it comes to New York City, Martha Biondi argues that beginning in the 
1940s, “activists developed a comprehensive agenda for criminal justice reform, including 
protection from unreasonable search and seizure, a halt to coerced confessions, the creation of 
an independent civilian complaint-review board, a law to end police immunity from criminal 
prosecution, greater accountability and disciplinary procedures within the department, more 
Black police officers, an end to media stereotyping of Black men as criminals, a halt to the 
criminalization of poor, minority neighborhoods, and better, fairer policing of Black neighbor- 
hoods.”9 Clarence Taylor demonstrates how in the immediate postwar period, New York City 
civil rights organizations intensified their mobilizations against police brutality, with the 
Communist Party playing an important role.10 Marilynn Johnson contends that policing 
acquired a strong discriminatory racial dimension in early twentieth-century New York and 
that eventual civil rights challenges to this practice led to unremitting conflict.11 This article 
adds to these perspectives by providing a history of the NYPD in the twenty years after World 
War II with an emphasis on the organization’s relations with minority populations. During this 
period, crime rates increased (Figure 2) while corruption remained a common attribute of 
police behavior. City administrations, understanding that citizens demanded effective policing 
and that rising crime undermined New York’s desirability, attempted to make the NYPD a 
corruption-free, disciplined, efficient, and responsive organization. These efforts were at odds 
with the desire of police rank and file to minimize management interference, work less, receive 
higher pay, supplement that pay with “gratuities,” participate in collective bargaining, and 
neutralize challenges by black freedom groups. While patrolmen resisted the reforms that their 
police commissioners attempted to institute, relationships between the NYPD and minority 
communities became increasingly acrimonious. Black civic organizations that were fighting 
for a more equitable distribution of municipal recourses became the most ardent critics of the 
NYPD, which they branded as a failed institution. 
This deterioration in policing poses a number of questions about the urban crisis. While sub- 
urbanization, deindustrialization, and fiscal stress help explain the decline of New York in the 
postwar period, would it be possible for the city to remain residentially desirable without ade- 
quate policing? While it is difficult to determine the causes of rising crime, and many historians 
and social scientists view changes in crime as structural, would it be possible to argue that an 
inefficient and corrupt police force did not contribute to the problem? Finally, how could blacks 
and Latinos who were moving to the city in great numbers during this period be incorporated into 
urban life, if the policing of their neighborhoods was impulsive and inadequate? 
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Figure 2. Total number of serious crime complaints in New York City by year. 
Note: This category is the sum of murders, rapes, robberies, assaults, burglaries, larcenies, arson, and thefts. Given 
problems with crime reporting by the NYPD, the accuracy of these figures is compromised. For example, the rapid 
increases in 1950, 1951, and 1952 are due to severe underreporting in the years before. The 1966 spike is also due to 
underreporting in the years before. The city administration conducted statistical approximations and claimed that the 
gathering of crime statistics became deficient in the early 1960s. While the quality of policing including the reporting  
of crimes deteriorated under Murphy whose tenure as police commissioner began in 1961, it is unclear when and to 
what extent the underreporting of crime actually began. 
Source: NYPD Annual Reports, 1944-1967. 
 
  The Making of the Most Problematic Municipal Agency, 1945– 1953 
On August 6, 1947, a rookie patrolman approached Lloyd Curtis Jones, a disabled African 
American veteran, who had been singing songs with friends near the Columbus Circle entrance 
of Central Park. The patrolman ordered Jones to move after checking his identification, but began 
to hit him with his nightstick because Jones did not move quickly enough. The patrolman ended 
up firing three shots into Jones’s stomach, because Jones grabbed the nightstick away. The NYPD 
refused to discipline the patrolman, claiming that his response was not out of the ordinary. Jones 
was charged with disorderly conduct, but a felony court refused to convict him.12 
The Jones shooting was one of numerous questionable police actions in the immediate post- 
war period, with New York City patrolmen brutalizing or killing black civilians. Some of these 
police actions included the following. On October, 29, 1945, patrolmen emptied their guns on a 
black driver on Eighth Avenue and West 144th Street in Harlem. The man, who had been pursued 
by a police patrol car, was coming out of his Buick sedan with his hands raised in surrender. After 
the patrolmen shot him, a crowd gathered in protest; police reinforcements arrived and chased the 
protesters away, clubbing a few of them. On June 7, 1948, Stephen Moses and his wife Tressie 
Mae Moses were accosted and beaten by two plainclothes police officers across the street from 
their home in Brooklyn while they were carrying bundles of clothes. On May 8, 1950, Thurmond 
4
Themis Chronopoulos (2015) Journal of Urban History 
 	
 
Towns, a garment worker from the Bronx, was shot and killed in St. Nicholas Park in Harlem. 
The patrolmen claimed that he ran away when they tried to question him about a purse snatched 
from a woman. This version of events was unlikely given that Towns, who was a union member, 
was regularly employed and had a large savings account. In all of these questionable incidents 
involving the police, the people victimized were African American men and women. World War 
II veterans represented a sizable portion of the victims.13 
As violent acts committed by white patrolmen persisted, African American civic organiza- 
tions complained to the city government while resentment toward the police in the streets of 
black neighborhoods was mounting. In 1946, Police Commissioner Arthur Wallander (1945– 
1949) denounced charges of police brutality and argued that a petition sent to the mayor was 
baseless. The following year, a number of prominent Harlem citizens met with Wallander and 
convinced him to appoint the Citizens Committee to End Police Brutality, which would investi- 
gate a number of controversial cases. To be sure, the committee could only make recommenda- 
tions, but its official sanction represented an improvement given that police officials seldom 
recognized that police brutality existed. However, the committee remained inactive and the New 
York Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
called for the resignation of the national organization’s representative, so that it could take legal 
action against the NYPD by itself. Then in May of 1948, popular disturbances occurred at West 
116th Street and Lenox Avenue in Harlem after rumors that a white patrolman had struck and 
killed a black woman. The city government sought strategies to better inform Harlem residents 
on police matters and the committee promised hearings on police brutality. The New York 
NAACP demanded that these hearings were public, something that the mayor and the committee 
rejected. At that point, the various organizations of the NAACP in the city held a rally outside 
City Hall. However, a gambling scandal caused the resignation of the police commissioner in 
1949. The mayor also resigned in 1950. With police brutality incidents becoming commonplace 
in many parts of the country, in 1951, the Civil Rights Congress submitted a 240-page petition/ 
report entitled We Charge Genocide to the United Nations. The report, which described hundreds 
of cases in which patrolmen had assaulted or killed African Americans in the United States, 
argued that police bullets were replacing the lynch rope.14 
With complaints continuing to come from civil rights organizations, in 1952, the U.S. 
Department of Justice sent FBI officers to New York to investigate allegations of police brutality. 
Police Commissioner George P. Monaghan (1950–1954) contacted the U.S. Justice Department 
and argued that this investigation threatened to completely destroy whatever morale was left 
within the ranks of the NYPD. In July of 1952, Monaghan made a deal with the head of the 
Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice James McInerney and U.S. Attorney Myles 
Lane under which he promised to conduct his own thorough investigation on police brutality, if 
the FBI suspended its own for a while. However, a few weeks later, NYPD patrolmen, in Hell’s 
Kitchen, brutally beat Jacob Jackson and Samuel Crawford while handcuffed. Monaghan refused 
to allow Assistant U.S. Attorney Daniel Greenberg to have FBI agents interview the NYPD 
patrolmen in the case and instead sent him a copy of an internal investigation; Greenberg found 
that report to be worthless. After Monaghan continued to stall, U.S. Attorney General James 
McGranery invalidated the agreement of Monaghan and McInerney. In February of 1953, 
Monaghan traveled to Washington, D.C., to meet with the Justice Department appointees of 
newly inaugurated president Dwight Eisenhower; however, these officials refused Monaghan’s 
outreach and leaked the previous agreement to the press. Civil rights groups became especially 
furious when they discovered the existence of this agreement while white ethnic organizations 
congratulated and praised Monaghan.15 
Recognizing that Monaghan’s efforts to undercut federal oversight had the possibility of 
undermining civil rights enforcement in the rest of the nation, U.S. Congressman Adam Clayton 
Powell convinced his colleagues on the House Judiciary Committee to conduct an investigation 
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into the agreement and its implications. NYPD officials denied the existence of any secret agree- 
ments while Monaghan called people demanding his resignation “un-American.” Mayor Vincent 
R. Impellitteri (1950–1953) continued to strongly support his police commissioner while the 
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) responded by authoring a forty-two-page statement 
in which it argued that civil rights groups were used by communists who wanted to weaken the 
NYPD. One of the PBA’s main contentions was that communists believed that the police “must 
be annihilated or at least immobilized before any country can be successfully communized.”16 In 
the end, the House Judiciary Committee did not act on police brutality and issued a report that 
downplayed the issue.17 
Despite all this, the NYPD created a Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB), staffed by 
three police officials who reported directly to the police commissioner, in order to investigate 
complaints by civilians against the police. The move was a reaction to the controversy created by 
Monaghan’s FBI agreement and an attempt by the Impellitteri administration to assuage the con- 
cerns of community organizations. While the CCRB proved to be ineffective in changing the 
NYPD’s record in police brutality cases, its existence formalized the complaint process.18 
In the immediate postwar period, the NYPD became the most problematic city agency in New 
York City, with police brutality being only one of numerous problems. The years between 1949 
and 1953 were especially difficult for the NYPD, with scandals, irregularities, investigations, and 
unfavorable reports surfacing every year. These problems compromised the ability of patrolmen 
to deal with many emerging crime problems in the years that followed. 
Things began to fall apart for the NYPD in 1949 when FBI administrators announced that they 
could no longer publish New York City crime figures in the Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin 
because they were too untrustworthy. Many officials in other cities had been complaining that the 
NYPD was not complying with the FBI data guidelines and that crime rates submitted about New 
York City were too low to be true. Indeed, many smaller cities that had modernized their gather- 
ing of crime statistics were regularly reporting higher crime rates in all categories. In 1948, the 
NYPD reported 2,728 burglaries as opposed to 11,743 in Chicago, 4,793 in Philadelphia, 10,363 
in Los Angeles, and 8,977 in Detroit. The NYPD also reported 7,713 larcenies versus 16,785 in 
Chicago, 4,000 in Philadelphia, 27,500 in Los Angeles, and 22,100 in Detroit. These numbers did 
not correspond to records of insurance companies, which showed that they paid on many more 
larceny losses than the NYPD reported. New York police officials tried to spin the problem as a 
disagreement between the NYPD and the FBI over crime reporting procedures, but this did not 
work. The discrepancy between reported and actual crime statistics explained the high number of 
complaints sent to the mayor about rising crime and police corruption. Although the majority of 
complaints came from people who concealed their names because they feared police retaliation, 
some of these complaints came from civic organizations. The result was always the same; police 
investigators usually reported that they were unable to confirm the alleged criminal conditions 
after surveying the area or that the problem used to exist but had since been corrected. Most of 
these NYPD responses were too dismissive of the complainants to be accurate.19 
Under pressure, in 1950, the NYPD improved the way that crime complaints were docu- 
mented and the results were staggering. The number of larcenies rose by 700 percent, robberies 
by 400 percent, assaults with gun and knife by 200 percent, and burglaries by 1,300 percent. The 
District Attorney of the County of New York, Frank Hogan discovered that crime statistics prior 
to 1950 were meaningless: usually the information provided by a complainant was thrown away. 
Patrolmen had even invented terms for this practice, joking that they had referred the crime com- 
plaint to the “detective can” or that the complaint had been “canned.” In 1950, NYPD officials 
instructed police rank and file to record all complaints and that canning would no longer be toler- 
ated. In fact, an April 1951 inspection revealed that despite the increase in crime statistics, police 
personnel were still dismissing many complaints, and further steps were taken to change the 
practice.20 
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Another problem for the NYPD was illegal gambling operated by organized crime syndicates. 
Despite Mayor William O’Dwyer’s (1946–1950) orders to tackle illegal gambling, bookmakers 
increased their activities and paid police to look the other way or even assist their operations. 
Complaints about illegal gambling and the cooperation of the NYPD inundated elected officials 
and law enforcement organizations. In July of 1947, an anonymous writer sent a letter to Governor 
Thomas E. Dewey that provided accounts of police protection for bookmaking in specific stores, 
houses, and street corners of Astoria, Queens. The writer, who did not disapprove of the practice 
of gambling but the way that its illegality made for a corrupt police force, argued that a pending 
probe by a Queens Grand Jury had only made the police more cautious. A month later, O’Dwyer 
appeared to be agreeing with this letter writer and argued that existing gambling laws had a ten- 
dency to breed corruption in the NYPD, and that although he was skeptical about them, he would 
still try to keep his administration free of corruption. This statement of the mayor over gambling 
confused many observers. In January of 1950, the mayor’s ambivalence to illegal gambling grew 
even more. O’Dwyer sent a letter to state legislative leaders likening the illegality of gambling to 
the prohibition of alcohol and made a case for the legalization and regulation of sports gambling 
by the state. He also claimed that the enforcement of antigambling legislation required too many 
resources that would be preferable to allocate elsewhere. Almost immediately, DA Hogan criti- 
cized O’Dwyer’s suggestion of legalizing gambling. Governor Dewey stated that the NYPD was 
capable of enforcing antigambling laws if the city administration wanted, and that he would hold 
the mayor and his police commissioner responsible if they did not. Meanwhile, a Brooklyn Grand 
Jury headed by Brooklyn DA Miles F. McDonald began to unearth evidence of police coopera- 
tion with the gambling operations of organized crime. O’Dwyer verbally attacked McDonald, 
called the Grand Jury inquiry a “witch hunt,” and took the side of the NYPD. After these attacks, 
the Brooklyn Grand Jury investigated the conduct of McDonald himself but exonerated him and 
continued its investigations. As the Brooklyn Grand Jury was stumbling into more evidence of 
police graft, O’Dwyer resigned. President Harry Truman appointed O’Dwyer U.S. Ambassador 
to Mexico. Although O’Dwyer relinquished his ambassadorship in 1952, he stayed in Mexico 
City until 1960. Police Commissioner Thomas P. O’Brien (1949–1950), who replaced Wallander 
at the beginning of 1949, also resigned during the investigation after trying to blame his depart- 
mental troubles on a communist conspiracy.21 
The reverberations of the scandal lasted until 1953, with arrests, trials, and departmental pro- 
ceedings taking place. Gambling kingpin Harry Gross and dozens of police who protected his 
organization were indicted. The city administration dismissed almost fifty patrolmen for corrup- 
tion. Many high-ranking commanders were also fired. Another 150 police involved in the affair 
resigned or retired. Efforts to distance the NYPD from the scandal consumed the entire term of 
Mayor Impellitteri.22 
In an effort to rebuild the NYPD, Impellitteri hired Bruce Smith of the Institute of Public 
Administration to survey the department. Smith, an international expert on criminal justice, had 
helped to reorganize about fifty police departments in the United States. Released in October of 
1952, after a fifteen-month investigation, Smith’s report was highly critical of the NYPD. The 
investigation found that the clearance rate for auto thefts, robberies, burglaries, and other larce- 
nies was 50 percent below the national average. More than eleven hundred patrolmen were 
involved in clerical and mechanical tasks, which could be performed more efficiently by trained 
civilians for significantly lower salaries. An additional two thousand patrolmen performed 
unnecessary or unproductive duties. Police personnel routinely abused sick leave. Patrolmen in 
charge of switchboards carried conversations, prolonging the average response time for emer- 
gencies to four or five minutes. The cases of 80 percent of patrolmen charged with misconduct 
were handled with extreme leniency; these cases included more than two hundred assaults on 
civilians, many of which were committed by intoxicated patrolmen. The study also argued that in 
many cases, the NYPD recruited rejects from the private sector and people who could not adjust 
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to society. Despite these findings, Smith’s conclusions were not too harsh; twenty years before, 
he had recommended that the City of Chicago fire its entire police force.23 
In the following months, instead of reforming the NYPD, the Impellitteri administration grap- 
pled with the findings of the study and eventually shelved it. Police organizations including the 
PBA scored the study as biased. Monaghan took issue with many of the conclusions of the study, 
strongly defended patrolmen, and argued that the characterizations of personnel in the report as 
misfits and industrial rejects were unfair and inaccurate. Deputy Mayor Charles Horowitz con- 
cluded that the report was “junk.” After hearings on the matter, the report was dismissed without 
action.24 While there was no police reform under Impellitteri, his defeat in the mayoral election 
of 1953 by Robert F. Wagner (1954–1965) renewed hopes for improvements. 
 
The Era of Failed Reform, 1954–1961 
When Wagner took office as mayor in 1954, he felt that the NYPD required substantial reforms, 
if it was to adequately serve the city. Many observers had repeatedly charged that the police force 
was corrupt, racist, and inefficient. In order to correct this, Wagner appointed independent, 
strong-minded, and reformist police commissioners. Indeed, his first two commissioners turned 
out to be so independent that they frequently clashed with the mayor himself. However, they 
experienced the greatest resistance from the PBA, which functioned as the patrolmen’s labor 
union; the association took advantage of a growing conservative political climate and changes in 
city policy in order to consolidate its power. By the early 1960s, despite having lost numerous 
battles, the PBA came out intact and more powerful. 
Wagner’s first police commissioner, Francis W. H. Adams, took office with a determination to 
reorganize the NYPD and improve its efficiency. He asked Chief Inspector Stephen P. Kennedy 
to enforce discipline on the force and to establish mechanisms that would prevent the cooperation 
of police and criminals. For a few weeks, the PBA privately criticized Kennedy’s initiatives. 
Then, on February 9, 1954, three hundred delegates of the PBA met and issued a resolution that 
bitterly attacked Adams. They charged that with Kennedy’s assistance, Adams had established a 
“shoo-fly” system. The term “shoo-fly,” which originally referred to criminals warning other 
criminals of police movements, was eventually used to mean a police officer who spied on col- 
leagues and reported them to superiors. The PBA alleged that under Adams, violations reported 
as part of the “shoo-fly” system included patrolmen wearing the wrong color socks, drinking 
coffee, or chatting while on duty. The PBA also attacked Adams for abolishing the Police Glee 
Club and Band. The PBA’s leadership requested that Wagner overrule his commissioner in these 
matters. Immediately, the Citizens Union came to the defense of Adams and likened his efforts to 
build up discipline and efficiency in the NYPD to “the tradition of our best police commissioners 
such as Theodore Roosevelt, Arthur Woods, and George McLaughlin.” The Citizens Union asked 
“whether the commissioner or the police brass is to run the department.”25 In the decades that 
followed, there was no satisfactory answer to this question. A few days later, Wagner publicly 
announced that he supported his police commissioner 100 percent and that he was working to 
elevate that number to 1,000 percent. Adams publicly asserted that he opposed efforts by labor 
unions to organize the NYPD. Bruce Smith entered the debate, stating that police discipline in 
New York approximated the nation’s worst.26 
Having prevailed, Adams continued to reorganize the NYPD. In the spring of 1954, Adams 
restructured the Midtown Squad, which was an independent unit that policed Midtown 
Manhattan’s shopping area. He assigned the members of the squad into precincts so that their 
patrols could be integrated with those of other local patrolmen. Adams also reduced the number 
of emergency service squads, because records showed that some of them had responded to an 
extremely low number of heavy duty emergencies and discontinued detective districts so that 
borough detective commanders could direct investigations more efficiently. Furthermore, Adams 
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merged the Headquarters Division with the Motor Transport and Maintenance Division and cre- 
ated a Bureau of Technical Services, transferred seven hundred patrolmen to active duty, devised 
a plan to civilianize crossing guards, and redesigned disciplinary proceedings. In the remainder 
of 1954, Adams shortened the top command of the NYPD, tightened regulations concerning 
personnel favoritism within the department, expanded the Narcotics Squad from one hundred 
thirty to two hundred detectives, directed the department’s division of licenses to enforce the 
compliance of groups organizing public dances, urged the business community to stop giving 
holiday gratuities to police personnel, and strengthened the department’s handling of juvenile 
delinquency by scrapping the old system and establishing Precinct Youth Councils.27 
Crime rates continued to rise in 1954, though there were reasons for optimism. While serious 
crime increased by 8.9 percent in the first six months of 1954, it decreased by 3.8 percent in the 
second half of the year. The NYPD appeared to be operating more efficiently, since the overall 
clearance rate of all major felony crimes reached 36.5 percent in comparison to 23.5 percent the 
year before. Adams argued that despite the much needed reforms, the NYPD required thousands 
of additional patrolmen to meet the demands of the growing population of the city; otherwise 
New York would become a “community of violence and crime.”28 He illustrated his point about 
manpower by showing how in 1932, New York City had 18,315 patrolmen, only 500 fewer than 
in 1954. However, the population of the city had increased by more than one million, street mile- 
age by 1,000 miles, dwelling units by 350,000, and motor vehicles by 600,000. In addition, 
patrolmen worked between 6 and 8.5 fewer hours each week and received at least one additional 
week of vacation each year. Wagner was convinced that such an increase in personnel was needed 
and authorized the appointment of about 1,500 new patrolmen by February of 1955 so that he 
could instill a climate of “law and order.” This appeared to be working because in the first half of 
1955, rates of serious crime declined by 13 percent. The clearance of serious crimes rose to 46.9 
percent.29 
In the summer of 1955, Adams resigned in order to rejoin his law firm and Wagner appointed 
Stephen P. Kennedy as his police commissioner. Known as a hard worker, strict disciplinarian, 
and incorruptible, Kennedy was behind many of the successful projects and reorganizations that 
the NYPD had undergone during his predecessor’s time. Wagner appointed Kennedy because he 
knew that he would demand that the NYPD operate at peak performance. Indeed, Kennedy cre- 
ated a system under which he rewarded productive detectives and officers and demoted or trans- 
ferred non-productive ones. In his first policy speech to the department, Kennedy warned ranking 
officers not to resist his reforms and argued that laggard personnel had no place in the NYPD. 
The PBA considered Kennedy’s appointment to be an affront. Kennedy had been accused of 
actually instituting the “shoo-fly” system under Adams and was seen as the architect of many 
disciplinary procedures established in the 1954–1955 period. More than this, many patrolmen 
thought that Kennedy was pretentious because he had shed his working-class Brooklyn accent 
and culture.30 
In the months that followed his appointment as commissioner, Kennedy began to shake up the 
NYPD. Almost immediately, he transferred twenty-three men from the Coney Island force 
because they were possibly implicated or knew about sexual activities with two fifteen-year-old 
girls. Days later, he bypassed the morals squad of South Brooklyn and had a special unit raid 
gambling establishments. Kennedy also appointed a squad to investigate police involvement in 
questionable morals cases in Brooklyn. A version of this squad was maintained throughout his 
tenure; he used it to monitor, investigate, and arrest corrupt police personnel. In his efficiency 
campaigns, which sometimes included him personally checking on patrolmen and their superiors 
to see if they were at their posts, Kennedy demoted hundreds of detectives, disciplined tens of 
them, and transferred many commanders. Hundreds of sergeants and tens of lieutenants were 
also rotated. The Sergeants Benevolent Association took exception to newspaper reports that 
applauded these transfers. The reports claimed that men who remained in the same precinct for 
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too long became stagnant. Sergeants felt that they were unfairly targeted because otherwise 
patrolmen and captains would also be rotated. Kennedy transferred so many sergeants because he 
had information that they had become coordinators of bribe schemes. Kennedy also required 
newer and tougher detective tests and eliminated an old practice of allowing a patrolman to 
attend detective school because of an act of bravery. In July of 1956, Kennedy asked all detec- 
tives to file reports on their activities over the past thirty months. He placed those who provided 
unsatisfactory answers on uniformed patrol duty.31 
Kennedy was credited with many initiatives that managed to reduce serious crime in low- 
income neighborhoods. In 1954, in his role as chief inspector, Kennedy designed Operation 25 in 
the 25th Precinct of Manhattan, which encompassed the area between West 110th and 147th 
Streets west of Fifth Avenue. Most of this area was in Harlem. Although 186 patrolmen worked 
in the precinct, only 25 percent of them were available for patrol duty because the rest were usu- 
ally assigned for special and emergency services. Kennedy assigned the entire graduating class 
of 250 recruits to foot patrol in the 25th Precinct during the last quarter of 1954. Kennedy also 
strengthened the detective, traffic, emergency, and youth services divisions of the precinct. Two 
and a half months later, robberies had declined by 71 percent, burglaries by 54 percent, grand 
larcenies by 58.3 percent, and auto-thefts by 69.4 percent. In general, the crime rates were lower 
while arrests and clearance rates were higher. Once Kennedy became police commissioner, ver- 
sions of Operation 25 were successfully tried in various high crime areas of the city. He deployed 
additional patrolmen in parts of the southern Bronx, northern Manhattan, and central Brooklyn. 
When in the beginning of 1958, serious crime increased by more than 8 percent in Brooklyn, 
Kennedy ordered all 660 rookie patrolmen on foot patrol duty in high-crime parts of the borough. 
The problem with this strategy was that it was highly irregular: the NYPD lacked the resources 
to implement these programs on a more comprehensive basis. Kennedy expected Wagner to 
appropriate funds for 5,000–7,000 additional patrolmen, which did not happen. Although crime 
rates declined by more than 16 percent in 1955, they began to slowly inch upward in subsequent 
years (Figure 2). To his dismay, in the long run, Kennedy had to reduce the number of beat patrol- 
men because of personnel shortages.32 
Despite various successes, Kennedy’s tenure coincided with numerous incidents in Harlem 
between patrolmen and civilians that could have escalated into serious mass disturbances. On one 
of those occasions on Friday, April 30, 1957, Hinton Johnson, a member of the Muhammad 
Temple of Islam who had taken the name of Hinton X, had his skull cracked by patrolman Mike 
Dolan at West 123rd Street and Lenox Avenue. It all started when an intoxicated Reese Poe was 
seen by police beating a woman. Patrolman Ralph Plaisance tried to arrest Poe who allegedly 
resisted arrest and bit him. Another patrolman joined the scuffle and was allegedly also bitten by 
Poe who was powerfully built and difficult to subdue. As the patrolmen were beating Poe with 
their nightsticks, Hinton in the company of Lypsie Tall and Frankie Lee Pots approached the 
scene of the incident. The patrolmen told the three men to move. According to the police, the 
civilians instead remarked, “You’re not in Alabama — this is New York.”33 Patrolman Dolan who 
had just arrived to the scene attempted to place Hinton under arrest for failing to move. Dolan 
claimed that he had to hit Hinton with his nightstick because he resisted arrest, though his account 
was later discredited. Everyone else at the scene was also arrested and brought to the 28th Precinct 
station house. A woman who witnessed the episode went to the Muslim restaurant on Lenox 
Avenue and informed people there. Minister Malcolm X went to the police station and asked to 
see Hinton. The police first claimed that they did not have Hinton in the station. Then they said 
that Hinton was in jail but that Malcolm could not see him. Malcolm replied that the hundreds of 
Black Muslims who had surrounded the station house would not leave unless he was allowed to 
see Hinton. As the crowd outside the station swelled into thousands, the police called a number 
of prominent citizens to go to the stationhouse and calm the situation. James Hicks, editor of the 
New York Amsterdam News, told the police that only Malcolm X could peacefully disperse the 
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crowd. The police arranged a meeting with Malcolm in Hicks’s office. However, when Malcolm 
got there, Deputy Police Commissioner Walter Arm told him that he wanted the demonstrators 
dispersed and that he was telling, not begging. Malcolm began to walk out when Hicks followed 
him and asked him to reconsider. Malcolm returned and asked to see Hinton and in case he was 
injured to have an ambulance take him to a hospital. Police officials accepted. Hinton told 
Malcolm that when he got to the station he was suffering from the blows of the nightstick and fell 
down on his knees. Once in that position he started to pray. At that point, the lieutenant in charge 
approached Hinton and hit him with a nightstick in the mouth and the shins. Since Hinton was 
bleeding badly Malcolm requested an ambulance. As more than two thousand Black Muslims, 
nationalists, and Harlem residents gathered outside Harlem hospital, the police prepared for a 
riot. To everyone’s surprise, Hinton was released from the hospital and taken back to the police 
station. Malcolm went with his attorney Charles J. Beavers to the station and arranged bail for 
Pots and Tall. After seeing Hinton, Beavers requested that he be sent to a hospital; the police 
refused, claiming that he had just been to one. Beavers requested a pillow for Hinton to rest his 
injured head, but the police refused. They finally permitted to fold Hinton’s coat and use it as a 
pillow. Malcolm left the station house and gave a command to his followers who had congre- 
gated outside to leave. They did so immediately. The next day in court, the police pushed for 
Hinton’s arraignment without his attorney’s presence who was in the same building working in 
another case. The judge set bail at $2,300, which the Black Muslims paid. They waited outside 
where the police were supposed to deliver Hinton. However, Hinton was set loose inside the 
building. Disoriented, he struggled to find his way out. After some time, he walked out stumbling 
and bleeding. The Black Muslims brought Hinton to Dr. Leona Turner, who ordered Hinton to a 
hospital immediately. He was taken to Sydenham Hospital in Harlem, where the doctors discov- 
ered a blood clot on the brain and internal bleeding. Hundreds of Black Muslims gathered outside 
the hospital. Malcolm told them to go home once he found out that some teenagers with zip guns 
had also gone there and that there could be trouble. As Hinton’s condition worsened on Monday, 
May the 3rd, word spread in Harlem that if he died there would be a riot. Trying to defuse the 
situation, high-ranking police officials met secretly with Malcolm. They assured him that they 
were trying to correct any wrongs on the part of the police and that there was an investigation. 
Malcolm told them that Harry Buffins, who had been outside Harlem Hospital on Friday night, 
was ready to testify that a patrolman wearing shield number 2775 said, “I’d have shot the nigger 
but the other cops kept getting in my way.”34 Another officer pointed at Malcolm and said, “We 
should break that bastard’s head because he is their leader.”35 Because of Malcom’s involvement, 
there were no popular disturbances. Hinton survived after a metal plate was inserted in his skull. 
Eventually, an all-white jury awarded him seventy-five thousand dollars, which was the largest 
award for police brutality in the city’s history.36 
On another occasion on Monday, July 13, 1959, Patrolman Norman Hammes and Lieutenant 
John Angrist dragged Carmela Caviglione from a Harlem restaurant by the hair to their patrol car 
while punching her and kicking her. The police sped away with Caviglione in their vehicle, but 
lost control and crashed into the center island dividing Seventh Avenue near West 117th Street. A 
crowd gathered around the police car and Charles Samuel, a postal clerk, asked the police who 
appeared to be beating Caviglione inside the car what they were doing. Patrolman Hammes got 
out of the car and grabbed Samuel while pulling his gun at the same time, despite Lieutenant 
Angrist’s pleas that this was not necessary. Hammes’s revolver accidentally went off and the bul- 
let hit him in the hand and Angrist in the back. When Caviglione and Samuel were taken to the 
West 123rd Street police station, a crowd of more than five hundred angry protesters gathered 
outside. Middleweight boxing champion Sugar Ray Robinson was summoned to the police sta- 
tion to calm the crowd. He was able to get the demonstrators to disperse by telling them that the 
prisoners had not been beaten. However, Robinson told reporters later that it was obvious that 
Caviglione had been physically abused and that he lied to the crowd outside the station, so that 
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he could prevent an explosive situation. In the aftermath of this event, Kennedy assigned eighty- 
eight extra patrolmen to the embattled Harlem police station and hundreds more in other parts of 
the city where a majority of African Americans resided. Kennedy declared that “we are not going 
to stand for mob violence anywhere in the city.”37 His statement did not take into consideration 
the possibility that the police involved in the Caviglione incident were at fault and that the com- 
munity was genuinely concerned about police misconduct.38 
In the days that followed, a number of responses revealed that there was no consensus in the 
black community regarding police behavior. General Counsel of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Thurgood Marshall expressed his support for Mayor 
Wagner and said that “they are crucifying that man [Kennedy],” even though he admitted that he 
might “be kicked for saying this.”39 Rev. William M. James of the Metropolitan Community 
Methodist Church on 126th Street and Madison Avenue told his congregation in a sermon that 
while police brutality had been a concern for the Harlem community, this was the wrong case for 
it. James was referring to information that Caviglione had a history of public violent episodes and 
that she was probably at fault. He went on to commend Kennedy for fighting graft and corruption 
in Harlem and requested that the police fought crime there even more.40 However, Aloncita 
Flood, the Vice President of the New York NAACP branch, in a WNYC radio broadcast claimed 
that recent mob violence in Harlem could be traced to a “pattern of discrimination and disinterest 
toward people of minority groups on the part of public agencies.”41 Jawn A. Sandifer, Chairman 
of the New York NAACP Legal Redress Committee, charged that the “police, more than any 
other single factor, are responsible for the rising tensions.”42 In a CBS interview, L. Joseph 
Overton, President of the New York branch of the NAACP called Harlem a “police state.”43 
These differing opinions reflected the paradox that defined the policing of minority areas such 
as Harlem during this period. On the one hand, patrolmen and their superiors did not pay much 
attention to crime; instead they looked the other way, received payoffs from organized crime, 
performed haphazardly, and tolerated conditions that would be unimaginable in affluent areas. 
On the other hand, patrolmen demanded deference and respect from African American civilians 
and routinely demeaned and brutalized individuals who appeared to be challenging their author- 
ity. On top of these problems, the incidence of crime in Harlem increased. In response, Harlem 
residents and their leaders appealed to the city administration for better police protection. They 
were heartened by determined police commissioners like Kennedy who went after corrupt police 
personnel and attempted to make the NYPD an efficient and responsible organization. 
Nonetheless, confrontations between African American civilians and white patrolmen continued 
and the split in the black community deepened, with some people requesting improved crime 
fighting and others demanding fairer treatment, even though the two were not mutually exclu- 
sive. The antagonism between African Americans and the NYPD intensified as black freedom 
organizations began to pay more attention to police behavior. 
These incidents kept on happening because even Kennedy underestimated the extent to which 
corruption had immersed the NYPD and the degree to which racial antipathy interfered with 
police work. The case of Harlem illustrates this point. In 1955, Kennedy embarked on a reorga- 
nization of Harlem’s police because the area had the reputation of being the numbers capital of 
New York City. Kennedy established a confidential police squad, which raided candy shops, cel- 
lars, stores, and other suspected numbers operators. Between 1956 and 1958, the squad managed 
to drive the numbers trade underground and probed many patrolmen who were allegedly collabo- 
rating with numbers operators. And yet, in 1959 it was revealed that the police in Harlem were 
still involved in most numbers operations. The intelligence division of the U.S. Internal Revenue 
Service investigated policy bankers in Harlem and East Harlem and ordered raids. Kennedy 
organized another secret squad, which photographed police engaged in corrupt activities and 
then arrested them. On March 3, 1959, Joseph Lucerda, a Harlem police sergeant who had 
recently retired, was arrested for drunk driving with almost twenty thousand dollars in cash and 
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an additional sixteen thousand dollars of bank book listings in his car. The money had come from 
the sales of numbers. A Manhattan Grand Jury formed to investigate the police in Harlem con- 
cluded that the entire tenth division of the NYPD did not enforce gambling and vice laws and that 
its members probably took part in these operations. The Grand Jury also found a complete break- 
down of numbers enforcement at the precinct level in Harlem and East Harlem, something that 
prompted Kennedy to further dismiss and reassign police personnel. Numbers operations in 
Harlem continued anyway.44 
In 1960, U.S. Congressman Powell launched a campaign against the corrupt practices of the 
NYPD in Harlem by pointing out that numbers operations were thriving there. In response, the 
NYPD conducted raids and arrested a number of numbers operators. At a rally in the Abyssinian 
Church, Powell angrily denounced the NYPD for discriminatory practices when enforcing the 
law and declared that thirteen Italians were in charge of numbers games in Harlem because the 
police had arrested most black bankers. The NYPD had an official policy of ignoring Powell’s 
comments, yet days later it raided Harlem again and arrested even more numbers operators. 
Powell continued his accusations that the NYPD was arresting minor black figures in the num- 
bers system and was allowing major white bankers to continue their trade. He gave frequent 
speeches in the House floor in which he listed the names of operators, the addresses of betting 
places, and the amount of money paid to the police. Powell also provided the names of the small 
number of lawyers and bail bondsmen handling the cases of those arrested and claimed that the 
Mafia was paying them. The New York Post sent its own investigative team to Harlem and con- 
firmed all of Powell’s allegations in a series of articles. This proved quite embarrassing for 
Kennedy, the NYPD, and the city administration. In the early 1960s, city, state, and federal inves- 
tigations revealed widespread corruption in Harlem that included the police and the courts.45 
In the meantime, requests by Harlem leaders to appoint more African American patrolmen and 
ranking officers in black neighborhoods and to improve the quality of policing there were rejected 
by Kennedy. He declared that the NYPD did not make appointments on the basis of race, reli- 
gion, or politics. Kennedy also did not accept requests to stop using Harlem as a place where new 
graduates of the police academy trained. He conceded that the NYPD used Harlem to assign 
“misfits” who were inappropriate for other parts of the city. However, Kennedy believed that this 
had changed and that the new recruits were well trained and capable. Harlem residents remained 
skeptical.46 In an essay published in 1960, James Baldwin expressed how a large proportion of 
the Harlem community felt about the police: 
 
None of the Police Commissioner’s men, even with the best will in the world, have any way of 
understanding the lives led by the people they swagger about in twos and threes controlling. Their 
very presence is an insult, and it would be, even if they spent their entire day feeding gumdrops to 
children. They represent the force of the white world, and that world’s real intentions are, simply, for 
that world’s criminal profit and ease, to keep the black man corralled up here, in his place. The badge, 
the gun in the holster, and the swinging club make vivid what will happen should his rebellion 
become overt. Rare, indeed, is the Harlem citizen, from the most circumspect church member to the 
most shiftless adolescent, who does not have a long tale to tell of police incompetence, injustice, or 
brutality. I myself have witnessed and endured it more than once. The businessmen and racketeers 
also have a story. And so do the prostitutes.47 
 
While police behavior in African American neighborhoods had always been a concern, at the 
time that Baldwin wrote this essay, it was becoming an important organizing issue. In the years 
that followed, black freedom organizations began to confront the NYPD with regularity. 
Besides problems with police misconduct in the field, Kennedy began to face serious chal- 
lenges from the PBA when in 1958 Patrolman John J. Cassese became its president. Cassese 
defeated eleven-year PBA President John E. Carton arguing that the association needed a new, 
more activist leadership that would confront Kennedy and the Wagner administration. During his 
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tenure as president, Cassese transformed the PBA into one of the greatest antagonists of city 
administrations. Cassese was elected as the leader of a more activist slate because patrolmen 
were upset over their declining status relative to management and along with that their declining 
incomes. Robert Fogelson has argued that before World War II police work was an important 
avenue of upward mobility for white ethnics: “For men who had little education and few skills . 
. . they received a decent salary that could be supplemented by regular payoffs, and if they put in 
their twenty or twenty-five years, could receive a modest pension.”48 In the postwar period, as 
police salaries failed to adjust to increasing costs of living and as payoffs became more risky, 
patrolmen grew increasingly dissatisfied. When compared to the salaries of teachers, plumbers, 
electricians, and draftsmen, patrolmen did not do as well. Meanwhile, commissioners such as 
Adams and Kennedy demanded outmost devotion, discipline, and peak performance from patrol- 
men, while dismissing all of their grievances and efforts to collectively organize.49 
The first clash between Kennedy and Cassese concerned the issue of police unionization. 
Since becoming mayor, Wagner had been strengthening the right of municipal employees to 
bargain collectively. In 1954, Wagner signed an interim order allowing city employees to form 
associations that could negotiate terms and conditions of employment. In 1956, Wagner and the 
Board of Estimate granted municipal unions the right to dues checkoff. In 1957, Wagner permit- 
ted public employee labor leaders to carry out union business instead of performing their assigned 
agency tasks. In 1958, he issued Executive Order 49 (EO 49), which formalized the collective 
bargaining process and codified grievance procedures. All of these changes excluded the NYPD; 
the city administration decided to undertake further studies in order to determine whether EO 49 
and other labor codes could apply to the police department. The PBA reacted to this exclusion by 
pressing for collective bargaining rights and threatening that patrolmen would join civilian labor 
unions. Weeks after Wagner’s EO 49, Kennedy rejected a proposal by Labor Commissioner 
Harold A. Felix to hold hearings on whether municipal collective bargaining rules should also 
include the police arguing that unionization would undermine both the discipline and the impar- 
tiality of uniformed police. In response, Cassese demanded that the city government recognize 
the PBA as a bargaining agent for patrolmen, allow dues checkoff for the PBA, and designate a 
third party outside the NYPD that would arbitrate in disputes between the police commissioner 
and police rank and file. Wagner sided with Kennedy in rejecting all these demands, yet a year 
later he said that the PBA should be allowed to receive membership dues through a voluntary 
payroll checkoff. The Supreme Court of New York, with the support of Wagner, decided that 
despite stated exclusions, the Board of Estimate had granted the right to dues checkoff to all city 
employees and that the PBA was entitled to voluntary payroll deductions of its members. On the 
other hand, the PBA did not succeed in its court petition regarding grievances; the courts sided 
with the Wagner administration’s decision to exclude the police from EO 49.50 
While the conflict over unionization as well as other issues continued, there was a showdown 
between Kennedy and Cassese over moonlighting—patrolmen holding second jobs outside the 
department. In the latter part of 1960, Kennedy initiated disciplinary proceedings against patrol- 
men found to be holding second jobs in Brooklyn and the Bronx. This happened after a patrolman 
with 366 days of sick-leave in five years had earned more than forty thousand dollars for outside 
work. Cassese argued that the anti-moonlighting move was unfair and that the commissioner 
would have to go after fourteen thousand of the seventeen thousand patrolmen who held outside 
jobs because their police pay was inadequate. The PBA also organized fundraisers to help pay the 
fines of patrolmen. Kennedy threatened to dismiss any police personnel found soliciting or con- 
tributing funds to pay the fines of patrolmen penalized for moonlighting. In response, the patrol- 
men issued a ticket slowdown. In retaliation, Kennedy transferred Cassese from a desk job at 
headquarters to full-time traffic duty at an isolated location. Three days later, patrolmen issued 
132 percent more tickets than on the corresponding day the year before. After an investigation, 
Kennedy characterized the ticket actions to be a strike and ousted hundreds of patrolmen from 
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radio cars and placed them on foot beats. He also devised a new regulation that required all police 
personnel to sign individual forms affirming that they did not hold outside jobs. Weeks later, a 
police surgeon prohibited Cassese, who was on sick-leave because he had a broken toe, from 
attending a PBA meeting in a hotel in Manhattan; the PBA transferred the meeting to the base- 
ment of Cassese’s building in Brooklyn and initiated proceedings to expel Kennedy from the 
association. The following day, Kennedy ripped up his PBA membership card in front of televi- 
sion cameras. The PBA expelled him. Meanwhile, patrolmen who were dismissed for holding 
second jobs could not convince the courts to declare Kennedy’s moonlighting regulation invalid. 
The dismissed patrolmen cited a court decision that had sided with an employee of the Department 
of Welfare who was dismissed because he held a second job after hours. However, the courts 
argued that police work was different from welfare work because the police were expected to 
respond to emergencies and perform at peak capacity. In the end, Kennedy prevailed in this con- 
flict with the PBA, though many patrolmen continued to secretly have outside jobs.51 
Early in 1961, Kennedy resigned from his post. This occurred after Wagner decided to reap- 
point Kennedy to a new five-year term and Kennedy surprised him by saying that he would only 
accept if the mayor gave a hefty pay-raise to the police. Wagner refused though the pay-raise 
demand was a ploy. Kennedy and Wagner had been clashing more frequently during this period, 
but given Kennedy’s popularity in the mass media, Wagner did not dare dismiss him. And there 
were more problems. Kennedy was coming under fire from many fronts. For example, he had 
offended Jewish groups by refusing to allow Jewish patrolmen take off work for the holidays. 
African American communities that had initially supported Kennedy had grown skeptical with 
his refusals to staff police precincts in minority communities with nonwhite patrolmen. They also 
had more and more grievances about the manner in which white patrolmen enforced the law. The 
Citizens Emergency Committee charged that fees levied on cabaret entertainers were transferred 
into the Police Pension Fund. They also alleged other corrupt practices and petitioned Governor 
Nelson Rockefeller to investigate the NYPD. Finally, the conflict between Kennedy and Cassese 
had made the police department lose focus. Wagner replaced Kennedy with Michael J. Murphy 
(1961–1965), who was thought to be less rigid.52 
With Kennedy out of the way, Wagner and Murphy tried to appease the PBA. Weeks after tak- 
ing over, Murphy established a police grievance procedure that Kennedy had opposed for many 
years. Patrolmen could now formally file grievances and appeal complaints to an authority out- 
side the NYPD. The PBA also gained a 15 percent pay-raise for its members. In 1963, Wagner 
extended EO 49 to cover the NYPD. The problem with this accommodationist approach toward 
the rank and file of the NYPD was that Murphy scrapped many of Kennedy’s policies, including 
his anticorruption drives. Graft made a resounding comeback in most departmental ranks. So did 
police indifference and misconduct. The gathering of crime statistics also suffered.53 
The failure to reform the NYPD during the Wagner years was disastrous, because the possibil- 
ity existed and was wasted. The first two police commissioners appeared to be well organized, 
corruption free, and determined to modernize the force. They actually succeeded on many fronts, 
and this can be seen in the relative stability in crime rates during the second half of the 1950s. 
However, the preoccupation of Kennedy with labor issues (with the exception of moonlighting) 
was misdirected, and this contributed to an increased antagonism with the PBA. Wagner’s incon- 
sistency when it came to the conflict between Kennedy and the NYPD did not help the situation 
either and ended up strengthening the PBA. Moreover, Kennedy did not understand the extent to 
which corruption was consuming the NYPD. Gradually, many of his anticorruption campaigns 
became reactive, responding to discontent by the community or to investigations by the courts 
and the federal government. Finally Kennedy failed to fulfil many of the requests of black civic 
associations. While the demands for more black patrolmen in black neighborhoods may not have 
improved the quality of policing there, the almost complete disregard of most complaints made 
by black leaders indicates that Kennedy did not understand the worsening conditions in minority 
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neighborhoods. Murphy’s appointment in 1961 coincided with Wagner’s growing disinterest in 
reforming city agencies and a desire to maintain a peace with public employee unions, even if 
this meant that the quality of municipal service delivery would suffer. The NYPD reverted to the 
unacceptable practices of 1946–1953, though this time it faced a more determined and conten- 
tious black freedom movement that was unwilling to accept police misconduct and inefficiency 
as a way of life. 
 
The Further Deterioration of Police–Community Relations 
While numerous organizations such local Democratic Party clubs, the Nation of Islam, the 
NAACP, and the YMCA were seeking the support and membership of black New Yorkers, in the 
early 1960s none of them was as successful as CORE. Unlike other organizations, CORE was not 
too restrictive, centralized, religious, or conservative.54 Illustrative was a letter sent by Arthur A. 
Stone to Cynthia K. Homire of CORE in 1960. Stone wrote: 
 
Your letter received today, with its pamphlet, was very welcome, I’ll be darned if I ever heard of this 
group before, but it’s exactly what I’ve been looking for, action; I joined the NAACP for 6 months, 
and not one action was taken, I was peeved, I’ve written Congressman Powell trying to interest him 
in a idea of mine to form a group that would fight all kinds of discrimination, against Negroes, 
Japanese, Mexicans, etc. and at last resort, I decided to form my own group, of friends I know. BUT, 
here you people were all setup, functioning and I never heard of you, and I wondered why, I think I 
know, CORE, sounds like a government agency, and tho I read of it, it never occurred to me it was a 
mass organization.55 
 
Stone expressed the feelings of many working-class African Americans who viewed the NAACP 
as a top–down reformist organization that had no interest in rallies, protest actions, and mass 
politics. This view of the NAACP may have been exaggerated, but many working-class blacks 
felt that the organization had lost touch with its base. Something similar had happened with the 
Urban League, which was usually even more conservative than the NAACP. In the early 1960s, 
CORE, with its decentralized structure and sponsorship of high-profile nonviolent direct actions 
in the South, appealed to many black New Yorkers. Because of the ease of establishing a CORE 
chapter, New York’s CORE affiliates increased from three to nine. The Manhattan chapter moved 
its offices to Harlem, so that it would be in touch with the community. CORE chapters picketed 
stores that refused to hire African Americans, demonstrated against indifferent landlords, and 
organized rallies against racial discrimination in the North and the South. CORE activists also 
began to focus on the police, because police misbehavior in black neighborhoods was becoming 
too frequent and overt. In its December 1962 meeting in New Orleans, the National Action 
Committee of CORE articulated its concerns regarding police brutality and asked CORE chap- 
ters in both the North and the South to undertake direct action campaigns that addressed the 
police. Besides police brutality, the National Action Committee discussed several other forms of 
police malpractice, including illegal arrests, mass arrests, illegal searches, and improper 
detention.56 
African Americans had three interrelated grievances when it came to the NYPD. The first 
concerned police inefficiency and corruption, the second police violence against demonstrators, 
and the third police brutality against individuals. CORE activists who were recruiting people in 
black neighborhoods discovered the extent to which police misconduct had become a significant 
organizing issue. 
Police apathy and graft were citywide attributes, except that in low-income neighborhoods 
they were more profound and visible. Besides receiving small pay-offs and cut-rate products 
from all kinds of businesses, patrolmen and ranking officials were involved in numbers, drugs, 
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gambling, and prostitution. Police participation in these operations was commonplace in minor- 
ity neighborhoods such as Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant, and while under Adams and Kennedy 
there were various anticorruption initiatives and secret units, they focused on numbers and gam- 
bling because of their pervasiveness. Murphy dismantled these initiatives when he became police 
commissioner and denied that the NYPD was corrupt: “We have our faults . . . but I don’t know 
of anyone who takes money from narcotics or prostitution. I don’t know of any policeman who 
wouldn’t despise a man who did that.”57 Murphy did not deny police involvement in numbers and 
gambling, probably because two different grand juries were investigating the NYPD and numer- 
ous patrolmen and ranking officers had been arrested for such offenses. Whatever the case, ille- 
gal activities committed by the police became more overt and regular under Murphy, and this 
included the drug trade and prostitution.58 
The issue of police violence against demonstrators grew in salience in the early 1960s after a 
series of vicious attacks against peaceful demonstrators in the South that were televised. In reac- 
tion, the membership of New York’s CORE chapters increased and black freedom rallies and 
other protest actions in the city also multiplied, eliciting repressive police actions. When the 
NYPD used patrolmen on horses to attack demonstrators who were peacefully sitting on side- 
walks, New York CORE chair Gladys Harrington said that “horses in New York are no different 
than police dogs in Birmingham.”59 In one of the biggest black political mobilizations in the his- 
tory of New York, a campaign to integrate the construction workforce that was building the 
Downstate Medical Center in Brooklyn in 1963, demonstrators were frequently roughed up by 
the police. Police violence was exerted even against conservative church members who seldom 
took to the streets while hundreds of demonstrators were arrested by a police force that was 
viewed as overzealous. Demonstrators at the construction site of Harlem Hospital, Rochdale 
Village, City Hall, ABC studios, the police commissioner’s office, the Triborough Bridge, the 
World’s Fair, and other locations also encountered a police force determined to use any means 
necessary. As police actions intensified, organizations such as the New York Civil Liberties 
Union and the New York Metropolitan Council of the American Jewish Congress established 
panels of volunteer attorneys available to represent arrested civil rights demonstrators.60 The 
rhetoric also escalated. Tenant organizer Jesse Gray in a picket line in front of police headquar- 
ters declared that “we must prepare to set up a picket line in front of any police precinct in which 
an arrest is made regarding the rent strike. We must destroy the image that the New York Police 
are democratic and not on the side of the slumlords.”61 Commissioner Murphy, who considered 
Reverend Herbert Callender, Minister Malcolm X, and Gray to be unreasonable agitators, replied, 
“to him and others of his ilk I say: We will not be intimidated. We reject your lies and so do the 
people of this city.”62 
While police brutality against individuals in everyday situations had always been a problem 
for the black community, it worsened in the early 1960s, and the frequency of potentially explo- 
sive episodes increased. Louis E. Lomax wrote in 1962 that there were at least four black lawyers 
who worked on a percentage basis as specialists in police brutality cases, making more than 
twenty thousand dollars each year. He added that the City of New York paid more than one mil- 
lion dollars each year to settle police brutality cases, most of which involved black civilians. 
Lomax described the situation as follows: 
 
The problem is aggravated in areas like Harlem where police brutality is an accepted fact of life. 
Without such cases to report, Negro newspapers would have considerable blank space. On the other 
hand, “transition areas,” such as the one in which I live, are far from exempt. The white people are 
moving out but many of them are still here; the police are on the prowl for suspect Negroes, and some 
white family can be depended upon to sound the alarm that a Negro is lurking in the streets near their 
home. Any Negro who happens to be walking, or riding, for that matter, down that street is apt to be 
in for it. For this very reason, I always keep my press card in my hand when I am driving home late 
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at night. I have been forced to pull my car to the curb by policemen four times in the past two years. 
Always my press card has ended the inquiry on the spot, but, in each instance, the police have told 
me they were looking for some Negro suspect.63 
 
On April 17, 1963, in one incident that could have caused serious and prolonged disturbances, 
Frank Stafford, a licensed door-to-door salesman was arrested after he was savagely beaten on 
Lenox Avenue near West 128th Street. Stafford was taken to Harlem Hospital for emergency care 
and then to Bellevue Hospital for treatment of his damaged right eye, after a three- to four-hour 
beating inside the police station. Stafford stayed in the hospital for two weeks. He had an eye 
surgery, which failed. The doctors had to remove his right eye to prevent infection from moving 
to the left eye. The incident began when some schoolchildren grabbed some fruit that had fallen 
to the sidewalk from two overturned stands outside Joe’s Fruit Stand on Lenox Avenue. Four 
patrolmen tried to catch the children, but the turmoil attracted older teenagers. The teenagers 
jeered the patrolmen, who called for reinforcements. More patrolmen arrived and began to attack 
people with their nightsticks around the area indiscriminately. Many of the patrolmen had also 
drawn their guns, aiming at people in windows and rooftops. Stafford was beaten after he ques- 
tioned a patrolman beating a teenager. Fecundo Acion, a Puerto Rican seaman, was also beaten 
after he intervened. The police arrested a number of people including Stafford and Acion and 
continued the beatings inside the police station. Although there was no riot, the events on Lenox 
Avenue that afternoon could have caused one. The police charged Stafford with beating up a 
schoolteacher on West 127th and Lenox Avenue, causing trouble in the fruit stand between West 
128th and West 129th on Lenox Avenue, and assaulting the police on 129th Street between 
Seventh and Lenox Avenues. However, witnesses saw Stafford selling women’s stockings for 
most of this time; he was only involved in the end when the police attacked him.64 
The day after Stafford’s beating, Captain Carl Ravens of the 28th Precinct wrote to every 
church and community center in the precinct area requesting assistance to maintain order in the 
summer months. The letter stated that “the police have been plagued with near riots during the 
past two years while attempting to perform their duties,” and that “the police have been ham- 
pered seriously while attempting to apprehend criminals.”65 This letter illustrated the extent to 
which the police believed to be acting properly in the midst of increased friction between its 
patrolmen and civilians. The community had its own interpretation, which was not as charitable 
to the police. 
The incidents that almost resulted in riots usually occurred in the area around 125th Street, 
which was the main commercial thoroughfare of Harlem (Figure 1).66 Police actions around West 
125th Street and Lenox, Seventh, and Eighth Avenues were dangerous because many people 
were proliferating and the indiscriminate clubbing of pedestrians did not always result in the 
desirable effect of having crowds disperse. The 28th police precinct located on West 123rd Street 
between Seventh and Eighth Avenues increasingly became an object of contention for many 
African Americans, with frequent protest actions outside of it. More than this, in the corner of 
Seventh Avenue and West 125th Street, black nationalists and other activists made speeches that 
gathered many passersby. CORE, located on West 125th Street between Eighth and St. Nicholas 
Avenues, held numerous gatherings in the area. The local chapter of the NAACP, located in the 
same building as CORE, held its own outdoor events as well and so did black churches from 
other Harlem locations. Hotel Theresa located on Seventh Avenue between West 124th Street and 
West 125th Street functioned as a meeting place where many black organizations regularly held 
high-profile rallies that attracted crowds into the thousands. Across the street, outside the National 
Memorial African Bookstore, activists held assemblies that drew thousands of people as well. On 
Lenox Avenue and West 116th Street, Mosque No. 7 of the Nation of Islam featured various 
religious and political events while the Black Muslims also held weekly gatherings in various 
locations around the business center of Harlem. By the early 1960s, the difficulties that the police 
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experienced increased because central Harlem became an epicenter of oppositional political 
activity and ordinary people were no longer willing to defer to the police.67 
The commercial center of Harlem is where the Harlem Riot of 1964 started. A CORE rally on 
Seventh Avenue and West 125th Street, protesting the killing of fifteen-year-old James Powell by 
Lieutenant Thomas Gilligan, ended with a march at the 28th precinct on West 123rd Street. After 
the crowd was pushed away from the exterior of the police station to Seventh Avenue, the crowd 
grew to more than a thousand; its dispersal by the police resulted in small groups that attacked 
stores. These groups were joined by others, and the disturbances spread to various blocks in and 
around the Harlem central business district. Although the insurrection also involved Bedford- 
Stuyvesant, there was no doubt at the time that the commercial center of Harlem was the epicen- 
ter of black activism and that police mishandlings threatened the peace of the area. Michael 
Flamm argues that the NYPD failed to adequately prepare for the aftermath of Powell’s shooting 
and that it committed a number of strategic mistakes in its handling of the riot.68 
In the aftermath of the riots, Mayor Wagner resorted to a number of symbolic actions. He 
increased the number of black patrolmen in Harlem and devised a new policy under which patrol- 
men would be responsible for informing the public in Harlem, East Harlem, and Bedford- 
Stuyvesant of the range of municipal services available to them. Captain Lloyd Sealy was the 
first black person to be appointed commander of the 28th precinct in Harlem.69 City council 
member Theodore Weiss resurrected his bid for a bill to create a Civilian Complaint Review 
Board staffed with nine civilians appointed by the mayor.70 Wagner stalled the bill, hoping that 
the urgency for it would pass. Police Commissioner Murphy opposed the bill and characterized 
charges of police brutality as “maliciously inspired” and a mechanism “aimed at destroying 
respect for law and order.”71 Murphy, who had been accused of allowing patrolmen to liberally 
use their guns during the disturbances of 1964, repeatedly dismissed claims of police brutality 
and attacked CORE and other civil rights organizations for being hypocritical and attempting to 
undermine the effectiveness of the police. In response, African Americans began to call him 
“Bull” Murphy after “Bull” Connor in Birmingham, Alabama, who had used fire hoses and attack 
dogs against civil rights demonstrators. Malcolm X contended that Murphy was “a dangerous 
man” because “his public statements give the policeman courage to incite violence.”72 
Meanwhile, crime continued to increase and police responsiveness to decrease. In the spring 
of 1965, Wagner who was still considering a run for a fourth term as mayor announced “a war 
against crime,” which he claimed to be his highest priority.73 In response, CORE declared open 
war on Wagner and his reelection campaign for a fourth term, because of his “complete apathy 
and disregard for the Negro and Puerto Rican communities and the major problems” of the city.74 
Congressman Powell predicted that in the upcoming election “Mayor Wagner is a sure winner 
and the city is a sure loser.”75 Had he campaigned for a fourth term, Wagner would have been 
viciously attacked for having allowed crime to increase and the NYPD to deteriorate. However, 
he did not seek a fourth term.76 
In 1965, John V. Lindsay, a liberal Republican congressman from the Upper East Side, ran for 
mayor of New York City. Lindsay blamed his predecessor for presiding over the deterioration of 
city agencies. While Lindsay was determined to remake the entire city government, he centered 
his 1965 mayoral campaign against the NYPD. As Jay Kriegel, Lindsay’s chief of staff/special 
counsel, asserted, “the 1965 campaign in a real sense was run against the police force. Not that 
we thought they were racists, but that the department was old and tired, and badly in need of 
modernization. But institutionalized racism was an important issue—the problem of brutality and 
the lack of minorities in the force.”77 Lindsay promised that if elected, he would improve police– 
community relations, modernize the NYPD, and establish a civilian police review board. Though 
an underdog, Lindsay narrowly prevailed in the 1965 election. 
From a civil rights point of view, Lindsay’s victory functioned as a realization of many of the 
claims made by African American activists in the postwar period. Decades of police misconduct 
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appeared to be coming to an end, and the establishment of a CCRB staffed by civilians satisfied 
one of the main goals of New York’s black freedom movement. To be sure, the PBA managed to 
defeat Lindsay’s CCRB in the polls in 1966 after being able to place the issue before the voters 
in the form of a referendum. Moreover, police efficiency declined even more while police cor- 
ruption reached even higher levels. The Lindsay administration tried to modernize the NYPD; 
however, it underestimated the extent to which the organization had irreversibly broken down, 
the magnitude of police corruption, and the power of the agency to destabilize urban governance. 
In the end, things did not work out for Lindsay, but his administration’s struggle for police reform 
appeased the black population of the city and deflated a tense and dangerous situation. 
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